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Abstract 
Scholarship on the challenges of ethno-linguistic federalism in 
contemporary Ethiopia is copious; yet a critical analysis of violent ethnic 
extremism in the country and its implications for the sub-region is rare. 
This article argues that violent ethnic extremism is a threat to the 
existence of Ethiopia and a destabilising factor for its neighbours. Based 
on qualitative empirical data, it attempts to address the knowledge gap 
and contribute to the literature by examining why violent ethnic 
extremism has persisted in the post-1991 Ethiopia and how it would 
impact on the stability of the Horn of Africa. Analysis of the findings 
indicates that systemic limitations of ethno-linguistic federalism; 
unhealthy ethnic competition; resistance of ethno-nationalist elites to 
the current reform; unemployed youths; the ubiquity of small arms and 
light weapons; and cross-border interactions of violent extremists are 
the major dynamics propelling violent ethnic extremism in Ethiopia. 
Thus, Ethiopia and the sub-region could potentially face cataclysmic 
instabilities unless collective, inclusive, transformative and visionary 
leadership is entrenched.
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1. Introduction1
Violent ethnic extremism is a threat to the existence of a contemporary 
Ethiopian state and a destabilising factor for the Horn of Africa. 
Literature indicates that the greatest risks of starting future wars will 
likely be ethnicism and the new nationalism that seems to be on the rise 
in many parts of the world in the 21st century (cf. Barton and Carter 
1993:555–556; Mishra 2017:270; Binik 2020:91). While violent 
extremists2 kill fewer people than traffic accidents3 or diabetes,4 they 
often target civilians, and pose grave challenges to human rights and 
dignities, and the security and well-being of individuals. As a strategy, 
extremism is invariantly adopted by intolerant actors who do not believe 
in dialogue, negotiation or discussion as ways of dealing with differences 
of ideas in a civilised manner (Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004:6; 
Appiah 2018:50). The only way for them to succeed is by terrifying 
innocent civilians (Rogers 2016:5; Harari 2018:161; Diamond 2019:390). 
In this way the potent perception is created that violent extremism (which 
takes different forms in different contexts, e.g. religious, ethnic, right 
wing) is a subversion of established political processes, and that a violent 
action can induce a change in the political situation by spreading fear 
(Mishra 2017; Binik 2020:13). The severe dangers of violent extremism, 
rendered as ethnic extremism in the contemporary Ethiopia, are ripping 
the society apart, with far-reaching consequences to the stability of its 
neighbours (Lyons 2019:123).
Studies on the challenges of ethno-linguistic federalism in Ethiopia 
abound; however, little has been done to translate this understanding of 
the systemic challenges and implications into a comprehensive analysis 
of the violent ethnic extremism in the country and the sub-region. 
1 The author is grateful to the European Institute of Peace for its initial funding of this study, 
i.e. as a policy cum working paper, and to its staff for comments and useful insights.
2 Since 11 September 2001, every year terrorists/violent extremists have killed only about ten 
people in the United States, about seven people in China, and up to 25 000 people globally 
(mostly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia and Syria).
3 Each year traffic accidents kill about 80 000 Europeans, 40 000 Americans, 270 000 
Chinese, and 1.25 million people in total (Harari 2018:159). About 5 118 people died in 
traffic accidents in Ethiopia during the 2017/18 fiscal year (News Africa).
4 It was estimated that the number of diabetic cases in Ethiopia was 800 000 in 2000, and that 
it may be expected to increase to 1.8 million by 2030 (Feleke and Enquselassie 2005:203).
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The present study, therefore, aims to address the existing empirical 
research gap and contribute to the academic literature. To this end, it 
first sets out the scene of the research context; second, it provides a 
conceptual framework of violent ethnic extremism, which is followed by 
an outline of the research findings; it then identifies and critically 
analyses the drivers and enablers of ethnic extremism in post-1991 
Ethiopia with its implications for the stability of the Horn of Africa; and 
lastly, it presents a conclusion and some policy recommendations.
2. Research context 
Contemporary Ethiopia (see the map above) is located at the centre of 
the Horn of Africa and is home to well over 115 million people. Its area 
of 1.2 million km2 is divided into nine regional states: Tigray, Afar, 

















































































































Map 1: Political map of Ethiopia
Source: Created from File:Ethiopia adm location map.svg by User:NordNordWest (July 2017).
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Harari, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional (SNNPR) 
States, and two city administrations, viz. Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa 
(Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 2010). The names of all regions 
bear ethno-linguistic identity, except for Gambella and Southern Regional 
State, to symbolise the post-1991 politics of ethnicity. 
The current ethnic extremism probably has its roots in the pre-1991 
nation-state building processes in Ethiopia. It is argued that the failure 
of the Abyssinian5 elites to share socio-political and economic power 
with and engage the non-Abyssinians in the nation-state building 
processes has contributed to the post-1991 unhealthy ethnic relations 
(Asafa 2004:70; Markakis 2011:35). The pre-1991 nation-state building 
projects, except for that of the military government (1974–1991), were 
founded on the legend of Fetha Nagast (the Law of the Kings) that 
interwove faith, nation and throne with a mythical past and a prophetic 
future. Hence, the King was ‘the Elect of God; by virtue of His Imperial 
Blood… and the anointing He has received, his power was unlimited, 
unaccountable and unchallengeable’ (see Markakis 2011:33-34). Among 
them, Menelik II (1889–1913) whose throne continued until 1930 
through Empress Zewditu, Lij Eyasu, and Regent Tefferi, remains a 
milestone in Ethiopian history. His reign marks the full restoration of 
imperial authority, its vast territorial expansion and incorporation 
(Abbink 2011).
During Emperor Haile-Selassie’s regime (1930–1974), Ethiopia acquired 
in 1931 its first constitution, the gist of which was contained in Article 4 
of the revised version of 1955: ‘In the Ethiopian Empire supreme power 
rests in the hands of the Emperor’: his person was ‘sacred’, his dignity 
‘inviolable’, and his power ‘indisputable’. However, the constitution did 
not properly recognise the multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of 
Ethiopian society (Bahru 2002), which was the major factor that led to 
the emperor’s overthrow by military coup in 1974 (Bahru 2002). 
The military government (Derg)6 (1974–1991) further consolidated the 
nation-state building process by moving peasants from northern to 
southern Ethiopia, according to an idea that had been the dream of 
5 Another name of Ethiopia, referring predominantly to Amhara and Tigrai/Eritrean 
highlanders in the past.
6 Derg, in Amharic.
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Ethiopian leaders since Emperor Menelik II. Resettlement had been 
considered by the Haile Selassie regime, during which a pilot project was 
started in the 1950s and some 20 000 families were moved by 1974. 
Important departures from the Abyssinian model were the Derg’s 
pronouncements on ethnic equality, cultural emancipation – including 
gender equality, the use of vernacular languages in schools and public 
places, and the ‘abolition of religious discrimination …’ (Bahru 2002:239, 
247). However, the underlying political structure of the Derg remained 
similar to its predecessors (Bahru 2002:239, 247). The ethnic composition 
of top-ranking military leaders during its regime evidently reflected the 
imperial era (see Table 1 below).






65% 20% 15% 100%
Source: Adapted from Markakis 2011:186–187.
For those who argue in favour of the pre-1991 nation-state building 
project (e.g. Levine 2000:xxi), it was the finale in the struggle for the 
‘reunification’ of Ethiopia, a process began by Emperor Tewodros II, who 
ended the civil wars of zemene mesafint, or ‘era of princes’ (1769–1855). 
It is further contended that the Horn of Africa had been under the 
control of the Emperors of Abyssinia since the advent of the Christian 
era until the revolt of Gragn Mohammed, a Muslim leader from eastern 
Ethiopia, in the sixteenth century (Marcus 1994:104). Levine aptly 
described Emperor Menelik’s project as ‘an in-gathering of peoples with 
deep historical affinities rather than a subjugation of alien peoples’ 
(Levine 2000:xxii). 
7 It is to be noted that most personnel in the military speak Amharic and identify themselves 
as Amhara. While they could be members of other ethnic groups; their identity was their 
profession and they were influenced by the whole political structure and peer group. 
Therefore, the percentage given may not be representative and it should be read with 
caution.  In spite of the security governance in post-1991 Ethiopia, there was no ethnic 
quota for recruitment or promotion in the military. It was solely merit-based (In-depth 
interview with former army Colonel, Addis Ababa, September 2020).
15
Yonas Adaye Adeto Violent ethnic extremism in Ethiopia: Implications for the Horn of Africa
For those who argue against the project, it was an internal colonial 
invasion which resulted in mass killings, destruction and expropriation 
of property, enslavement, and genocide. ‘At the time’, according to the 
counter-argument, ‘Ethiopia was a slave-owning medieval state and… 
slavery in the Oromo states of the Gibe River region was downplayed as 
a minor derivative of the Abyssinian trade’ (Leenco 1999:156). ‘In Oromo 
oral history’, as Asafa (2004:163) argues, ‘Ethiopian leaders are seen as 
criminals, bandits and slavers; in Ethiopian history they are depicted as 
heroes and builders of the “nation”’. 
On balance, it is acknowledged that the expansion cum incorporation 
processes, common in nation-state-building endeavours worldwide (see 
Tilly 1990:67), incurred heavy human and material cost when entrenching 
structural factors in ethnic relations. That does not mean, however, that 
ethnic groups in Ethiopia have always been violently antagonistic to each 
other. There have been times of cooperation, such as when a unified 
front faced the Italian invasion to protect Ethiopia from colonialism in 
1896. Nevertheless, the failure to manage diversity during the time of 
Emperors Menelik and Haile Selassie, as well as the military governments 
led to resistance culminating in the creation of ethnic political 
organisations. These include the first Weyane Movement in Tigray in 
1943; the Oromo Bale revolt in the 1960s; the Ogaden National Liberation 
Front (ONLF) in 1960; the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 1960; the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1970; and the Tigrian 
Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) 1974–75 – all of which led to the 
downfall of the Derg in 1991 (Abbink 2011; Yonas 2014). 
Following the demise of the Derg, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) (1991–2018) emerged out of the TPLF, a 
Marxist-Leninist ethno-nationalist liberation movement. The TPLF 
labelled the historical Ethiopian state as a ‘prison of nationalities’ 
whereby the country’s diverse ethnic communities had long been 
exploited by the Amhara group of the imperial family (Markakis 2011; 
Fisher and Meressa 2018). Consequently, a politico-military power shift 
occurred (observe Table 1 above and Table 2 below and compare the pre-




Table 2: Ethnic composition of top military leadership in post-





























Population size in 
Ethiopia (%)9 6.1% 26.9% 34.5% NA 15% NA 83%
Highest rank 
command chiefs
9 1 0 0 0 0 10
Heads of army 
commands
4 0 1 0 0 0 5
Heads of army 
command divisions
13 3 4 1 0 1 22
Headquarters 
combat service and 
combat support 
staff commanders
13 0 1 0 0 0 14
Military training 
centre commanders
10 0 2 1 0 0 13
Total number of 
generals or 
commanders 
49 4 8 2 0 1 64
Adapted from Yonas 2014:172. 
The shift was meant to resolve the age-old inequality in ethnic relations 
and to prevent violent conflicts. The irony, however, is that it fuelled 
more violence-creating tensions among ethnic identity groups, although 
it did make some positive contributions towards exercising cultural 
rights and celebrating diversity – making unheard voices heard. What is 
more, ethnic federalism has generated competition between ethnic 
groups, mainly their aspiring elites, over ‘resources’ such as land, water, 
minerals, federal funds, and communal or religious identity. ‘It was due 
8 SNNPR – Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region of Ethiopia.
9 Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 2010.
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to political interests that they took position against each other’ 
(see Abbink 2011:612).
Consequently, Ethiopia has recently seen fresh protests by different 
ethnic groups, e.g. the Oromo and Amhara (Lyons 2019), the country’s 
two largest ethnic groups representing 70% of the population (see 
Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 2010). To quell the protests, a state 
of emergency was instituted in 2016, but protests continued and large 
numbers of arrests were made. In February 2018, Haile-Mariam 
Dessalegn, then Prime Minister and Chairman of the EPRDF, stepped 
down saying his resignation would be ‘vital in the bid to carry out 
reforms that would lead to sustainable peace and democracy’ (Al Jazeera 
2018). The EPRDF commenced a process of self-reflection on who to 
nominate as the new party chair and Prime Minister, and the process 
concluded in the election of Dr Abiy Ahmed as the new Prime Minister 
on 2 April 2018 (Reuters 2018). The new Prime Minister took bold 
measures: (a) releasing political prisoners and prisoners of conscience 
(Cable Network News [CNN] 2018);10 (b) reviewing and replacing 
various laws that contradict basic human rights; (c) involving women in 
the highest leadership positions (Washington Post 2018); (d) drawing 
citizens from the peripheries to be core members of the new ruling 
Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP),11 which replaced the EPRDF (even 
though TPLF opposed the replacement); (e) engaging opposition parties 
in the political processes; and (f) reforming the military (All Africa 
2019). Moreover, the new government improved its relations with 
Eritrea, for which the international community awarded Dr Abiy Ahmed 
the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. That might be a vital moral boost towards 
addressing the issues of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa and 
ethnic extremism in Ethiopia. However, the precise meaning of both 
violent extremism and ethnicism remains elusive. The following section 
attempts to operationalise them in the study context. 
10 The state of emergency was not lifted until 5 June 2018. See Cable Network News 2018.
11 These were not in the decision-making positions in the ethnic federal arrangement of 




3. Conceptual framework of violent extremism and ethnic 
extremism
3.1 Violent extremism12
Violent extremism is a radical ideology, which occurs when the actors 
express their beliefs through violence or call for violence (cf. Southers 
2013:6). Southers has identified some major cognitive features of this 
condition:
•	 Intolerance and superiority: Violent extremists assume the moral high 
ground ascribed to their ideology.
•	 ‘Otherism’: In the present context this can be rendered as ‘mette’,13 
loosely translated as ‘outsiders’ ‘settlers’ or ‘non-indigenes’. It refers to 
those who do not belong to the mainstream ethnic group of a region/
territory.
•	 Generalisation: Extremists put anyone who disagrees or opposes their 
views into one category. 
•	 Doomsday scenarios and conspiracy theories: Violent extremists believe 
that an apocalyptic outcome will follow from a failure to heed to 
their mission.
•	 Code speak: Violent extremists use particular codes to frame and 
dehumanise their opponents. 
Similarly, Sezgin (2007:19) offers some major behavioural features of 
violent extremists: 
•	 Using violence against human beings and threatening to use more 
violence.
•	 Inducing terror/fear in a target group who usually are innocent 
civilians and non-combatants.
12 The terms ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ are used interchangeably by many authors. 
See for example, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) 2017, Preventing Violent Extremism through Education: A Guide for Policy-
Makers; Yuval Noah Harari 2018, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century; Steven Pinker (2018) 
Enlightenment now: The case for reason, science, humanism and progress.
13 ‘Mette’ is an Amharic term, which denotes people who were characterised as ‘Others’, who 
‘came’ from a different location (region or territory) to settle in another area within the 
same country, Ethiopia. They were targeted by violent ethnic extremists and evicted from 
their abode for their ethnic identity, e.g. Amhara ethnic group was evicted from Oromoia 
region, Oromo from Somali, Tigray from Amhara, Woliata from Sidama. It started in 1991 
and reached a peak in 2018.
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•	 Intimidating target groups for publicity.
•	 Communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences displaying 
barbaric images.
•	 Insisting that all acts are political in character. 
The concept of violent extremism becomes clearer when it is 
contextualised in relation to ethnic extremism to which we now turn. 
3.2 Ethnic extremism 
Ethnicism and new nationalism are on the rise in some countries and are 
feared to become the starting points of wars between and within countries 
(Barton and Carter 1993; Binik 2020). According to Scruton (2007:236) 
ethnicism is the desire to conserve or recapture a political identity based 
upon race, region, or an ethnic group membership.14 Extremism, on the 
other hand, is a radical ideology of taking a political idea to its limits: its 
intention being to confront and eliminate opposition. It refers to intolerance 
towards all views except one’s own, and the adoption of means to political 
ends which disregard accepted standards of conduct, including the life, 
liberty and human rights of others (see Robertson 2002:392). It follows that 
ethnic extremism is a belief in and an expression of a political identity based 
on race, region, blood and language affinity: the aim being to confront and 
eliminate opposing views, persons, groups or institutions. Nevertheless, it 
needs to be understood and underlined that being loyal to one’s ethnic 
group is a key human characteristic, which should be accepted, acknowledged, 
appreciated and respected. However, when ethnic loyalty inclines to violence 
with the aim of getting rid of other fellow human beings, then it is 
metamorphosing into violent ethnic extremism. 
The very concept ‘ethnicity’ ought to be operationally defined to critically 
analyse violent ethnic extremism. Horowitz (2000:211) perceives ethnicity as 
an end by itself; for Williams (2011:113–126) it is a means to an end; and for 
Coleman and others (2007:56) ethnicity is a social construction in a conflict 
situation. Among the characteristics of ethnicity are the following. Firstly, it 
refers to a social unit, with a common language, territory and belief system. 
Secondly, it is a coordinating vehicle for group mobilisation in an ethnic 
conflict, whose boundary is defined by the elite’s will to recruit followers 
(Coleman 2004; Williams 2011). Thirdly, ethnicity is constructed by and 
14 The ethnic group members are identified not primarily in terms of political institutions, 
but in terms of blood relations, language and regional attachment (Scruton 2007:236).
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emanates from socio-political and historical contexts (see Yonas 2014:41). 
Put together, ethnicity is a relational concept; it is a tool that is used 
instrumentally to pursue strategies, a means a social group employs to 
reduce uncertainties of life chances, and a conceptual mechanism that 
provides a basis from which strategies are created (see Hale 2008:88; Tamir 
2019:120). 
Some scholars (e.g. Isaac 1975:120; Huntington 1996:90; Carbone 2018:69) 
argue that the key reason why some people identify so strongly with ethnic 
groups – even to the point of being willing to kill or die for their groups – is 
that they are inherently linked with people’s deepest feelings, the things that 
stir the blood: core needs for dignity, self-esteem, and/or belonging. When 
one’s group is threatened, cheated, or denigrated, one’s own self is threatened, 
cheated, or denigrated (Isaac 1975:120). Ethnicity thus tends to generate 
intergroup violence, separatism, nationalist mobilisation, ethnic voting, and 
other forms of divisive behaviour, with variation mainly arising when 
different groups are ‘balanced’ or constrained in some way from asserting or 
resisting dominance (see Connor 1989:200; Apter 1997:91; Kimmel 
2018:123).
However, a large body of literature rejects the above claims. Fukuyama 
(2018:26) and Nderitu (2018:315, 461) counter-argue that both ethnicity 
and ethnic politics can be alternatively perceived as a function of other 
pursuits: e.g. power, material resources, security, or status (see also 
Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Many of these theorists stress the role of 
Machiavellian elites, said to manipulate otherwise peaceful, cooperative 
populations into ‘ethnic frenzies’. Mueller (2000:60) and Pinker (2011:330), 
for example, rule out inherently ethnic passions as causes of the Rwandan 
genocide and the Yugoslav civil war, blaming ‘thugs’ who ran rampant, 
fomenting conflict in order to enrich or empower themselves. ‘The roots 
of the Rwandan genocide’, Meredith (2011:487) states, ‘was caused not by 
ancient ethnic antagonism but by a fanatical elite engaged in a modern 
struggle for power and wealth using ethnic antagonisms as their principal 
weapon’. He concludes: ‘Politicians, demagogues, and the media used 
ethnicity as a play for popular support and as a means of eliminating 
political opponents’ (Meredith 2011:487). Politics, more than anything 
else, are at the centre of the issue in ethnic extremism. Brass (1997:50) 
argues that ethnicity does not really serve as a coordinating device, but 
almost entirely as a discourse that guilty elites invoke to obscure the real, 
venal causes of violence that they incite (my emphasis). The real causes are 
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usually political power, natural resource or socio-economic injustice and 
inequality, with some variations in the context. 
This has been demonstrated by life experiences of the 27 years’ rule of 
EPRDF in Ethiopia. When a strong ethnic mentality is supported by the 
country’s constitution and is combined with political manipulation, the end 
result is violent ethnic extremism, a variant of violent extremism in the 
Ethiopian context. Empirical data analysis demonstrates this in the following 
section. 
4. Research findings
Following from the above discussions this study raises one major question 
with its derivative: Why has violent ethnic extremism persisted in post-1991 
Ethiopia? And what are its implications for the stability of the Horn of Africa? 
To respond to these questions, qualitative data were collected using 
Convenient Sampling criteria (Miles, Huberman and Saldaña 2014:115) 
from federal and regional states of Ethiopia focusing on Addis Ababa, 
Assossa, Oromia, Ethiopia-Somali, Tigray, Amhara, and Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) Regions. In 12 to 18 months, 50 in-depth 
interviews (IDIs) and 20 focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted as 
summarised in the following table (see annex A for guiding questions of 
IDIs and FGDs): 
Table 3: Summary of research design
Research 
focus 
Methods of data 
collection 















stability of the 
Horn of Africa 
Field data from 
IDIs and FGDs 
with key 
informants; text 




well as online 
materials; and a 









(FGDs) with key 
informants in 12 
to 18 months
Political/policy analysts, 
academia, civil society 
leaders, political leaders 
of the Federal as well as 
Regional Governments; 
opposition party 
leaders; human rights 
activists, former EPRDF 
members; traditional 
community leaders; and 
international 
community in Addis 
Ababa
Tabulated by the author.
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The data generated were triangulated by document analysis, e.g. 
government proclamations, news reports, press releases, and reliable 
online sources. These were thematically analysed and the initial findings 
were presented in validation workshops in Addis Ababa and in Mekele, 
Tigray, before they were written as a working paper and finally as an 
academic article.15 Three major drivers cum enablers of violent ethnic 
extremism have been identified: the flaws of Ethiopia’s ethno-linguistic 
federalism; resistance to the new political dispensation; and, youth 
unemployment and porous borders. 
4.1 The flaws of Ethiopia’s ethno-linguistic federalism
The major drivers and enablers of violent ethnic extremism emanate from 
the ethno-linguistic federalism the EPRDF pursued to rectify the flaws of 
pre-1991 state building processes in Ethiopia. It encapsulated all the pre-
1991 exclusions, injustices and marginalisation of non-Abyssinians in terms 
of only one variable: ethno-linguistic identity questions. It enshrined its 
political philosophy in the constitution, Article 39 (3), and (5), which reads: 
‘Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full 
measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions 
of government in the territory that it inhabits…’ (Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia). Under Article 39 (1) and (4), the 
constitution conferred the right to self-determination, including secession, 
to ethno-cultural communities. Not only did it recognise ethno-linguistic 
identity, but it also created identity-based regional states and made them the 
constituent units of the Ethiopian federation (Mehari 2010; Lyons 2019).16 
This created antagonistic ethnic nationalism, which gives 80 recognised 
ethnic groups significant sovereign power. 
In a closer examination, at least three flaws of EPRDF’s mono-causal 
approach are conspicuous: 
•	 The defects of pre-1991 Ethiopian nation-state building processes were 
more than ethnic-identity questions (see Yonas 2014:49; Getachew 
2018:15).
15 Workshops, 23 January 2019, Addis Ababa and 4 March 2019, Mekele, Tigray, northern 
Ethiopia.
16 Ethno-cultural communities are groups of people who share culture/customs, language, 
beliefs, identities, and inhabit an identifiable contiguous territory. Cf. Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995:art. 39 (5).
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•	 There is no single identity as such for a person or a community 
(Sen 2006:24–25) – an individual can have more than 70 identities 
which holds true to communities as well.
•	 In pre-1991 Ethiopian polity, it was not exclusively Abyssinians who 
ran state building processes (cf. Levine 2000; Getachew 2018). 
Hence, the measures EPRDF took to right the wrong were based on 
wrong assumptions and led to more violence and injustices rather than 
curing them.
Consequently, all nine ethnic-based17 regions have expanded their 
Special Forces, and the federal army could now be outnumbered by the 
combined regional Special Forces (The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 2020). Large segments of people growing up during 
this period were ‘brainwashed’ and taught, by school curricula, about 
‘territorialising identity’ and ‘ethnically identifying with territory’.18 
So, they have found thinking about other regions of Ethiopia ‘nearly 
impossible’.19 The underlying point, one of the key informants states, is 
that:
Ethnic federalism made people think in terms of their ethnic 
identity only: not as Ethiopian, but as Amhara or Bertha, Gumuz or 
Oromo, Sidama or Somali, Tigre or Wolaita…In short, ethnic 
federalism which facilitated conditions for violent ethnic extremism, 
is an existential threat to Ethiopia as a state and society with 
negative implications for the stability of the Horn of Africa.20 
It underpinned the notion that certain ethnic groups belong primordially 
to certain parts of the country (killil) – and not to others – and in turn, 
that specific parts of the country belong to specific ethnic groups only – 
and not to others – who are ready to kill or die for their ethnic identity, 
a phenomenon termed as ‘Otherism’ or ‘mette’ (Southers 2013:6). The 
17 The creation of special forces was before the creation of the new region – Sidama National 
Regional State.
18 Focus group discussion with in-service teachers from Oromia, South, Amhara and Afar 
regional states, August 2019, Addis Ababa.
19 Focus group discussion with in-service teachers from Oromia, South, Amhara and Afar 
regional states, August 2019, Addis Ababa.
20 ‘Killil’ is an Amharic word to indicate an administrative region or regional state in the 1995 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
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consequence of ethnic federalism was exhibited all across the country, 
but I will mention only a few incidents gleaning from the 50 in-depth 
interviews and 20 focus group discussions: 
First, mass rallies had been taking place in Ethiopia for several months 
since 2 April 2018, signalling strong support for Dr Abiy’s reform 
agenda. On 23 June 2018, however, a grenade was thrown during one of 
these rallies in Addis Ababa, in an abortive attempt to assassinate the 
Prime Minister. The attack killed two and wounded about a hundred 
unarmed innocent civilians, who were rallying in support of the Prime 
Minister’s ‘inclusive politics’ as opposed to the ‘divisive ethno-
nationalistic rules’ as described by most of my informants in IDIs and 
FGDs. Initially, suspicion fell on the ‘old guards’ of the regime, and 
many allegations were made that the attack had been due to Dr Abiy’s 
ethnic background. Eventually, alleged Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 
operatives were charged by the Federal Attorney General (British 
Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] 2018b). Second, there was widespread 
havoc and terror induced in September 2018 in Ashewa Meda, and in 
Burayu suburb of Addis Ababa, where scores of civilians were killed 
and ‘a five-year old girl was raped and later died’, which epitomises 
violent extremism (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] 2018a). 
In addition, across the country, between 2017 and 2019, there was a 
sharp escalation in community tensions and local clashes that led to a 
spike in internally displaced persons (IDPs). There was ethnic violence 
in the Oromia and the Somali regional states along the administrative 
border (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs [OCHA] 2018). ‘Oromos were expelled from Ethiopia-Somali 
region, and Somalis were evicted from Oromia. Tigrayans were forced 
out of Amhara region; Amharas were expelled from Oromia and 
Benishangul regions’ (The New Humanitarian 2019). Violent conflicts 
between the Oromo and Gedeo ethnic groups displaced approximately 
970 000 people in the western Guji and Gedeo zones of neighbouring 
Oromia and the SNNPR (The New Humanitarian 2019). By February 
2020, 1 735 481 people had been internally displaced.21 
21 Official sources list the figure of 2.33 million, but in the workshop at Addis Ababa in 
January 2019, figures as high as 3 million people were repeatedly mentioned as most 
accurately reflecting the rate of internal displacement. By February 2020, it was 1.7 million. 
See International Organization for Migration 2019. 
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In short, these acts showcased what Robertson (2002:392), Schmid 
(2004:375), Scruton (2007:237) and Sezgin (2007:19–20) outlined as 
ways in which violent ethnic extremism is operationalised and used 
against fellow human beings on the basis of the victims’ ethnic origin – 
in order to induce terror/fear in a target group and eliminate them; to 
wreak havoc under innocent civilians and non-combatants, and to 
mobilise their own ethnic group against others. These are by no means 
the only examples of violent ethnic extremism in Ethiopia over the last 
27 years; but they illustrate what violent ethnic extremism is and what 
it does as an emerging trend in Ethiopia with negative implications for 
the Horn of Africa (see Table 5). In fact, when asked, during a workshop 
on violent ethnic extremism, the majority of participants (82.5%) saw 
its risk as considerable, with 45% rating it is as ‘high’ and 37.5% as 
‘very high’ (see Table 4).
Table 4: Validation workshop participants’ views on ethnic 








How serious an 





0% 5% 12.5% 45% 37.5% 100%
Number of participants 0 2 5 18 15 40
Tabulated by the author.
In the same vein, participants in the validation workshop were also asked 
how ethnic extremism in Ethiopia impacts on the stability of the Horn of 




Table 5: Validation workshop participants’ views on the impact of 
ethnic extremism in Ethiopia on the stability of the Horn of Africa 
How does ethnic extremism in Ethiopia  
impact on the stability of the Horn of Africa?
Major descriptors of the impact
Out of 40 
people
%
1. Attracting and involving the same ethnic 
groups from neighbourhoods in the violent 
conflicts in Ethiopia (e.g. Afar of Djibouti, 
Oromo of Kenya, Somali of Somalia, Nuer of 
South Sudan) 
39 97.5
2. Flow of refugees and displaced people across 
the borders 
40 100
3. Flows of small arms, light as well as heavy 
weapons across the borders illegally 
36 90
4. Facilitating the flow of extremist groups and 
ammunitions from neighbours (mainly al 
Shabaab from Somalia)
37 92.5
5. Sponsoring demonstrations, roadblocks and 
dissemination of fake news via social media in 
clandestine in Ethiopia to terrorise civilians 
and make them flee to their kin and kith in the 
neighbourhood
37 92.5
6. Trans-border organised crimes: money 
laundering and human trafficking – mainly 
involving young women and boys displaced by 
ethnic violence
39 97.5
Tabulated by the author
This is consistent with the media report: ‘Ethnic tensions are the biggest 
problem for Ethiopia [and its neighbours] now’ (The New Humanitarian 
2019). Although Abiy’s aggressive reform agenda has won praise by 
many, if not all, the impact of inter-communal tensions and ethnic 
violence presents a serious challenge for his leadership and the Horn of 
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Africa. The tension has not emerged by chance; it is a political strategy, 
as some of the IDI and FGD members stated. Outraged by the actions of 
some of the former EPRDF leaders, one of the key informants compared 
violent ethnic extremists with the corona virus:
The World Health Organisation (WHO) advises us to wash hands, keep 
social distance, wear masks, stop shaking hands, and be safe from the 
coronavirus. Unless you ‘cleanse’ your heart and mind from ethnic 
extremism, restrain from spreading poisonous ‘hate speeches’, stop 
intimidating the innocent, and respect human values, violent ethnic 
extremism endangers all human race including the actors. Coronavirus, 
like small pox, will disappear once we discover vaccines; violent ethnic 
extremism, however, is harder to eradicate since it is engrained in the 
hearts and minds of the thinkers and actors.22
In sum, even though the roots of post-1991 conflicts are to be found in 
the pre-1991 Ethiopian exclusionary political culture, field data and 
document analysis reveal that the major factors for the spread of violent 
ethnic extremism in contemporary Ethiopia is the very political 
philosophy pursued by the defunct EPRDF regime, which is stymying 
the present political dispensation with a view to diverting the route of 
the reform. 
4.2 Resistance to the reform 
Resistance to the reform emanates from various sources. For some 
analysts, the greatest challenge to the reform remains reconciling ethno-
regional interests with the Pan-Ethiopian cause to arrive at a durable 
bargain that has not been achieved with the system of ethnic federalism 
(Fisher and Meressa 2018:8; Khisa 2019:12). For others, past EPRDF’s 
authoritarianism is unlikely to sit comfortably with a reform agenda 
focussed on balancing civic and ethnic politics (Brown and Fisher 2019; 
Tsega 2019; Alemayehu 2020). For some of the key informants an 
emerging ‘dangerous political culture’ is the peril for the reform:
A mob hanged a man upside down in Shashemene (south Oromia 
Region); burned churches in Jigjiga (Ethiopia-Somali region), mosques 
in Mota (Amhara Region), and people to death in Hawassa (SNNPR) 
and Dire Dawa City Administration. University students are being killed 
22 Telephone interview, Addis Ababa, 6 April 2020.
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by fellow students from other ethnic groups on campus in various parts 
of the country. No one was held accountable and responsible for these 
atrocities. The issue is that unless the vigilante groups are kept in check, 
unless law and order as well as the rule of law are upheld, the reform will 
face serious challenges.23
The empirical data further evidences that the resistance stems from 
individuals and groups that label themselves ethno-nationalists. 
According to my key informants, TPLF-friendly actors are looking 
currently for potential allies in Oromia and elsewhere in Ethiopia to 
bring ethnic politics back by displacing the new dispensation.24 This is 
part of a strategy to bolster support for Ethiopia’s system of ethnic 
federalism against ‘demands from those calling for a more united and 
diverse federalism’.25 Ethnicity and ethnic politics serve as a ‘discourse 
that guilty elites invoke to obscure the real causes of violence that the few 
elites incite’ (see Brass 1997:55). Hence, ethnic competition in Ethiopia 
is utilised by elites (Tsega 2019:70; Alemayehu 2020:3) intent on devising 
mechanisms of subverting the rule of law, which they sense is placing 
themselves at risk of being held accountable for past abuses.26 
Following the current reform, violent ethnic extremism, causing deaths 
and destruction, has been widespread in Southern Ethiopia, as an eye-
witness account reported.27 One of the nine Ethiopian regions with its 56 
ethnic groups has recently seen a large drive for increased autonomy.28 
In fact, the Sidama ethnic group gained autonomous status by a 
referendum in November 2019; and others have pursued similar 
objectives, spurred on by centrifugal forces. One interviewee observed:
The questions of autonomous status by all zones of SNNPR is a challenge 
for the new leadership. There are activists in all zones related to or 
supported by [a] few former EPRDF leaders. On the eve of the Sidama 
23 Telephone interview, Addis Ababa, 6 May 2020.
24 In depth interviews, Adama and Bahr Dar, November 2019. 
25 In-depth interviews, Addis Ababa, January 2020.
26 Focus group discussion with journalists, lawyers and policy analysts, January 2019, Addis 
Ababa.
27 Telephone interview with an eye witness from Hawassa, 26 July 2019.
28 The other three multi-ethnic regional states are Gambella, Benishangul Gumuz, 
and Harari.
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referendum, [a] few activists in Hawassa would go around and mark ‘red’ 
(Code Speak) the gates/doors of non-Sidama ethnic groups’ to be 
demolished; hence, the ‘Others’ or ‘mette’ should be terrorised and live 
in fear – or leave the area.29 
4.3 Youth unemployment and porous borders
Ethiopia’s population is growing fast. The fertility rate is 3.9 children per 
woman (United Nations Population Fund 2020). In 2017, 63% of 
Ethiopia’s 105 million people were in the youth bracket (below 24 years 
of age) (United Nations Population Fund 2020). The country’s 
population is expected to grow to 190 million by 2050, and 250 million 
by 2100 (United Nations 2017). 
Moreover, each year, the 49 universities in Ethiopia produce an army of 
youth for the job market. With the youth bulge combined with the 
structural ethnic competition embedded in Ethiopia’s ethno-political 
system, and the high levels of internal displacement, there is a serious 
risk of violent conflict. Furthermore, some unemployed youth are made 
to disseminate ethnic-based hate speeches over social media to spread 
fear and suspicion among the public. As one of IDI participants 
reiterated:
The new leadership stands for Oromo ethnic group excluding other 
nationalities … it is anti-Tigrigna and TPLF; it securitises the TPLF and 
the Tigrayan people; it does not respect the constitution and ethnic 
federal system; it is a neoliberal and western satellite government … 
there is no rule of law in the country … therefore, the previous leaders 
and system should be back in power ….30
While unemployment creates the opportunities for recruitment into 
violent extremist groups, hate-speech acts as a motivating factor. Certain 
youth are easily persuaded by fake-news and some actors who are against 
the reform. In Assossa (Benishangul Gumuz), for example, it was 
reported that young men were hired as ‘hit squads’, many of whom had 
29 In-depth interview with a member of the Council of Regional State, Hawassa, 
October 2019.




received higher education but were unable to find employment.31 A large 
number were said to have been involved in ‘criminal acts’32 sometimes 
having links across the border since most borders in the Horn of Africa 
are porous. 
Finally, flows of unemployed youth as refugees from Ethiopia to Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia or Sudan/South Sudan further complicate the 
already fragile situation. Such population movement can offer 
opportunities for the extremists to exploit the ethnic tensions that are 
prevalent in the sub-region. Most unemployed youth activists obtain 
small arms and light weapons through illegal trade with various countries 
in the Horn of Africa, and use them for criminal acts. Major routes across 
the porous borders are those from Somalia into Ethiopia-Somali; from 
Sudan to Amhara, South Sudan into Gambella and Asosa regions; and 
through Moyale on the Kenyan border to some parts of Oromia and 
SNNPR in Ethiopia.33 Hence, the easy access to and availability of these 
weapons serve as reinforcing factors for violence. Most recent killings 
along ethnic lines in Hawassa, Guji, and Gedo in southern Ethiopia, and 
Wellega, western Ethiopia, have been linked to the wider availability of 
these weapons and unemployed youth34 that serve as enablers and drivers 
of violent ethnic extremism.
5. Conclusion 
This study has examined why violent ethnic extremism has been 
perpetuated in post-1991 Ethiopia, and how this phenomenon impacts 
on the stability of the Horn of Africa. From the critical analyses and 
discussions of qualitative empirical data, it can be concluded that, in the 
Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular, the following 
combination of several factors poses calamitous risks of violent ethnic 
extremism: 
•	 the systemic limitations of ethno-linguistic federalism whose genesis 
goes back to pre-1991 Ethiopian nation-state building processes
31 In-depth interview with former head of Security and Administrative Affairs of Benihsangul 
Gumuz, December 2019.
32 In-depth interview with former head of Security and Administrative Affairs of Benihsangul 
Gumuz, December 2019.
33 Focus group discussion, Hawassa, February 2019.
34 Focus group discussion, Hawassa, February 2019.
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•	 unhealthy ethnic competition
•	 the ethno-nationalist elites’ resistance to the current reform 
•	 unemployed youth susceptible to propaganda and cross-border 
interactions with violent extremist groups such as al Shabaab, and
•	 easy access to small arms and light weapons.
For a viable future, therefore, collective, coordinated, proactive and 
visionary actions should be taken pre-emptively. Once violent ethnic 
extremism is unleashed, its spirit is more difficult to contain than the 
coronavirus pandemic, as witnessed in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in 1990s. 
Thus, there is an urgent need for strategies that address violent ethnic 
extremism in Ethiopia and build durable peace in the sub-region. 
First, institutional reform, including revision of the post-1991 
constitution of the country and that of the regional states, is one of the 
key measures by which the Government can address the current surge in 
ethnic violence. The constitution insufficiently sets out the divisions of 
power between the federal and regional levels, leaving excessive openings 
for rights to self-determination, including secession or breakaway from 
Ethiopia. Any reform of the constitution would be expected to address 
these questions. It would furthermore be expected to answer the 
questions around ‘Ethiopian-ness’: what are the building blocks of the 
Ethiopian federation, and what place will there be for the different ethnic 
groups within it? It should be emphasised, however, that any type of 
constitutional reform will need to be very carefully crafted, in order not 
to embolden centrifugal forces or increase the ethnic competition it aims 
to alleviate. 
Second, to deal with the structural causes and dynamics of ethnic 
extremism, it is vital that dialogue should be promoted and peace 
education provided. Civil society and academia should play significant 
roles in facilitating dialogue and interactions. Academia needs to engage 
in peace research, peacebuilding and provision of peace education to 
deal with the underlying causes of ethnic extremism and its impacts – 
both immediate and long-term. Such courses can be provided from 
kindergarten through to the university levels in order to entrench a 
culture of peace in Ethiopia. Its contents need to pinpoint sources of 
conflict, peaceful ways of handling conflicts, communication strategies 
and skills, the meaning and ways of preventing violent extremism and 
other pertinent components of peace and conflict studies. It would 
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contribute to transforming Ethiopia’s political culture from clan- and 
ethnic-based to civic- and citizen-based politics. 
Nevertheless, it is worth underlining at this juncture that pledging 
allegiance to one’s own ethnic identity group is a universal practice in 
human communities and needs to be accepted and respected. The 
problem only arises when ethnicity becomes an organising principle of 
politics, economy, security, foreign policy and the entire polity of a 
nation. This can lead to ethnic extremism, as has been the case in Ethiopia 
for the last twenty-seven years (1991–2018). Therefore, it is imperative 
to strike a balance between ethnic identity and citizenship politics. That 
said, the collective as well as individual ethnic identity of every Ethiopian 
should be respected, while at the same time Ethiopian national identity 
need to be stressed. 
Third, the state machinery, including the Federal Government-regional 
states relationship, is in need of profound reform. However, in doing so, 
it may be counter-productive to pour ‘new wine into old bottles’. 
Fourth, deeper reform in the security sector is needed to ensure that the 
complex configuration of security forces – military, federal police, 
regional police, regional special police, and militia – will effectively 
cooperate in addressing violent ethnic extremism. Moreover, 
strengthening sub-regional organisations, such as the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), for collective action against violent 
extremists, such as al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, is of paramount 
significance. 
Furthermore, the current reform in Ethiopia, which aims at building 
sustainable peace and development in the country and the sub-region, 
needs to be given stronger internal institutional tools and support at 
sub-regional/regional and global levels to flourish, since failure thereof 
will have negative implications for the stability of the Horn of Africa. 
Finally, reflecting on and drawing lessons from the past failures and 
successes, the way forward calls for engaging all the conflict parties in a 
nation-state building process – conducted in a spirit of forgiveness and 
reconciliation. That may contribute to transforming unhealthy ethnic 
relations into a cohesive, diverse, peaceful, prosperous and resilient 
multi-ethnic Ethiopia with positive spill-overs for the Horn of Africa.
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